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Embargoes, Quarantines and
Sanctions: Is the UN Nagging
Rhodesia and South Africa?
... I am reluctant to follow the U.N. majority in demanding a war against
the South African and Rhodesian governments. It may be frustrating that we
have to wait for a provocation which clearly marks these governments as a
danger to peace; but until an insurgent government can be recognized, there
are many things a private citizen can do for Africans which the United States
government cannot do and which the opposition cannot ask it to do.
Collective Security,
Interventionism and the Left
HENRY M. PACHTER
It was on March 17, 1970, that the United States first used its veto in
the United Nations Security Council. The United States joined Britain in
vetoing a properly adopted Security Council resolution which would have
condemned Britain for its refusal to end by force the "rebellion" in Rho-
desia. This resolution of the Security Council dated December 16, 1966,
was historic in the annals of international organizations and would also
have required all states to cut off contact (diplomatic, economic, railway,
telegraphic, postal, etc.) with the Rhodesian government.'
In vehement opposition to this ukase is the late Dean Acheson, former
secretary of state, who claimed 2 that the United States is engaged in an
international conspiracy, instigated by Britain, and blessed by the U.N., to
overthrow the government of a country that has done us no harm and
threatens no one. According to Acheson, "This is bare-faced aggression,
unprovoked and unjustified by a single moral principle."
In the third report of the U.N.'s special committee on the enforcement
of the Rhodesian sanctions, it appears that the three reasons that justified
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ostracizing Rhodesia from the family of nations were (1) secession from the
British Commonwealth, (2) Rhodesia constitutes a threat to the peace, and
(3) failure to eliminate racial segregation (apartheid) in that country. Let us
examine these three charges in order to evaluate their substance and
legitimacy.
The question of the right of Rhodesia to secede from the British Com-
monwealth3 might well be considered in the light of the American colonies'
secession from the British Empire. The charge that Britain brings against
the Rhodesians, as Acheson points out, is one that George Ill once
brought against the Americans, and sought unsuccessfully to enforce by
arms. The colonies felt it necessary, as Mr. Jefferson put it, "to dissolve
the political bands which (had) connected them with another (people), and
to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." Certainly, if
anyone should be sympathetic to this action by Rhodesia, it should be the
Americans.
And yet, by the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 4 the Presi-
dent is authorized by Congress to take executive action in support of any
mandatory decision of the Security Council. The only case in which that
authority has been used is that of Southern Rhodesia when President
Johnson, by executive order of January 5, 1967, forbade United States
companies to trade with that country. The first criminal action brought
against a company since the imposition of this action occurred in 1970,
when the defendant was fined $10,000 for conspiracy to violate regulations
imposing economic sanctions of Rhodesia.5 A New York corporation
pleaded guilty to charges of importing $367,000 worth of chrome concen-
trate and ore from Rhodesia.
The importation of chrome from Rhodesia is, according to some sources,
of vital interest to our national defense; by general agreement, Rhodesia
produces the finest metallurgical chrome on earth. After the imposition of
the sanctions, the United States was compelled to purchase its chrome
from the Soviet Union, at twice the pricey This imposition of sanctions by
the President was, of course, a show of solidarity by the United States to
its ally, Britain. Unwillingness to enforce such sanctions by the United
States would also have weakened the power and authority of the U.N.
Senator Harry S. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, has recently introduced an
31an D. Smith announced the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
from Britain in November, 1965.4Title 22 para. 287C USCA.5U.S. v. William H. Mullers & Co. Inc., New York Times, April 5, 1970.
GJames J. Kilpatrick, Boston Globe, October 4, 197 1.
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amendment to the sanctions which proposes to permit the resumption of
chrome purchases from Rhodesia. He argues that the United States should
not be dependent on the Soviet Union for this strategic material. However,
only 10 per cent of this country's annual chrome purchased, is needed for
defense purposes, and more than 44 per cent of all economic and national
needs can be bought from non-Communist countries. 7 The irony of the
situation is that Rhodesia's total production of chrome for the next three
years is already committed.
It is quite clear that the adoption of the Byrd amendment (the Senate
passed it 64-36) cannot be justified on national security grounds. If the
amendment is adopted, it would put the United States in violation of its
obligations under the U.N. Charter. There seems to be a vast change in the
view of the Chief Executive since President Johnson, while the Security
Council was acting on a resolution on imposing sanctions, ordered the
turnback of a cargo of Rhodesian sugar that was headed for New York.
There was also the recent United States decision to grant Union Carbide
a license to import 150,000 tons of Chromide ore from Southern Rhodesia
into this country. This occurred after the U.N. resolution was adopted, but
before the Executive Order implementing it was signed. Union Carbide
remitted to its subsidiary in Rhodesia, $2.6 million for the purchase of ore.
The company waited until April, 1969, to put in its plea for special
permission to obtain the ore. 8
Let us now turn to the second point raised in the list of malefactions
allegedly perpetrated by Rhodesia in justification of the U.N. sanctions:
that a threat to the peace existed in Rhodesia. Ambassador Arthur J.
Goldberg admits that resort should be had to Chapter VII only in ex-
ceptional circumstances, and only when faced with a threat or actuality of
international violence. 9 He acknowledged that indiscriminate resort to
Chapter VII could vitiate the important safeguards of national sovereignty
condemned in that paragraph. 10 It is important to keep in mind, in this
context, Article 2 (7), which reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter...
Ambassador Goldberg argues, however, that Rhodesia is a unique situ-
ation, in that the United Kingdom has the legal right and the legal respon-
7 Boston Globe, September 29, 1971.
8Boston Globe, January 15, 1971.
9Arthur J. Goldberg, Law and the United Nations, 52 A.B.A.J. 813 (September, 1966).
Old., at 815.
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sibility to bring an end to the alleged secession, designed to deny in-
definitely the basic human rights of the vast majority of the people of that
country.
Another action taken by the Security Council in implementing the Rho-
desian sanctions has raised considerable critical comment. In April, 1966,
the Council found that there was a threat to the peace in that tankers then
approaching the Port of Beira, were reasonably believed to be carrying
petroleum destined for Rhodesia. The Council called on the United King-
dom to use force, if necessary, to prevent the arrival of the vessels at Beira.
Although it was alleged that this was the first time in the history of the
U.N. that the Security Council had authorized the use of force under
Chapter VII, Ambassador Goldberg pointed out that the use was author-
ized by the Council, when faced with threats to the peace in Korea and the
Congo. Former Justice Goldberg goes on to say that the passage of the
tankers constituted a threat to international peace, and the authorization to
stop them by force, if necessary, was the least violent means available for
Britain to discharge her legal responsibility.
The problem of a threat to peace in Rhodesia arises from the danger that
that country could be the scene of a proxy war between the Cold War
protagonists. The cataclysmic danger of an atomic confrontation has com-
pelled the nuclear giants to support client states in various military engage-
ments all over the world (Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, the Congo, Egypt/Israel),
with the everpresent danger that a spark may be ignited. It is, therefore,
incumbent on the Cold Warriors rigorously to refrain from permitting these
brush fires to escalate into conflagrations.
Rhodesia, where whites are outnumbered by nearly 20 to 1, 5 million
blacks to about 250,000 whites, had gained nearly 900,000 blacks and only
33,000 whites since she claimed independence in 1965. The danger of this
tinder box is quite evident. Every African nation at the time of its in-
dependence vowed to free its black brothers in servitude, with the use of
force, if necessary.
Failure to eliminate racial segregation (apartheid) is a third charge made
against the government of Rhodesia. The fact that the country has not yet
achieved the status of one man-one vote is quite understandable; it took
the United States some 180 years before the Supreme Court handed down
Baker v. Carr." The real question is: Is the country's condition moving in
the direction of giving its black inhabitants their human rights? It is as-
serted 12 that the new constitutional protection for the blacks would be
11369 U.S. 186.
12Boston Globe, October 4, 1971.
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guaranteed by two safeguards, certain constitutional rights would gain new
judicial protection and a solemn treaty would embody Rhodesia's pledge
against regressive amendments.
With regard to South Africa, we again have sanctions imposed for the
specific purpose of putting pressure upon the government to adhere to the
Declaration of Human Rights with respect to its blacks. The majority of
the natives continue to be oppressed, segregated and denied the fruits of
their own labor. The blacks labor under inhumane conditions, are denied
the right to organize a trade union, bargain collectively or strike.'
3
The African nationalists, denied opposition within their country, backed
by independent black Africa and driven, in the absence of Western support
to look to Moscow and Peking, have turned to guerrilla warfare. The 300
million blacks in Africa see in the perpetuation of apartheid the ultimate
insult to their dignity, and in the failure of the U.N. to act, proof of the
unwillingness of the United States and other Western powers to repudiate
white supremacy. 14
The control by the Republic of South Africa over Southwest Africa is
one of the particularly bitter problems which has kept that part of the world
in internecine strife for several generations. Southwest Africa was taken
from Germany by a British-South African military force in World War 1.
The League of Nations gave South Africa a mandate to govern this terri-
tory in 1920. When the League ceased to exist after World War I1, its
political and legal charges were turned over to the U.N.; thus Southwest
Africa was adopted in the Trusteeship System.
Thereafter, the Pretoria government extended some of its national pol-
icies of racial segregation into the territory of Southwest Africa. The world
has been traumatized by the stories of human repression and degredation
emanating from these dark regions of Africa and especially Southwest
Africa. On November 4, 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted separate
proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice"5 in
a case concerning the continued existence of the mandate for Southwest
Africa and the duties and performance of South Africa as mandatory
power.
South Africa thereafter filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of
the court, and the proceedings on the merits were suspended. On Decem-
ber 21, 1962, the court rejected the four preliminary objections raised by
13Aaron Segal, Editor, African Report Magazine, letter to New York Times, June 7,
1971.
14Leslie Rubin, National Vice-President of the Liberal Party of South Africa,
1953- 1960, letter to New York Times, December 17, 1967.
15[I.C.J. Pleadgs., Vols. I-VII].
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South Africa and upheld its jurisdiction. A second phase of the case was
decided in July, 1966, when the court, by an 8 to 7 vote, found that
Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have any standing to bring
the litigation before the court.
In October, 1966, the General Assembly terminated the mandate of
South Africa and set up a fourteen-member committee to recommend
practical means for the administration of the territory. In May, 1967, it
decided to establish a council that would be based in the territory until
independence, the target date for which was June, 1968. The Pretoria
government thwarted all efforts of the council to enter the territory. 16 The
International Court of Justice, in its latest decision, decided (June, 1971)
that South Africa was an illegal possessor of the territory and must vacate
it, so that the U.N. can prepare it for independence.
The decision of the International Court of Justice is not a mandatory one
in as much as it is only an advisory opinion. 17 It is seriously doubted that
South Africa will abide by the opinion.' 8 The question is; what action can
and should the members of the U.N. take to uphold the Chater vis-a-vis
South Africa?
There are at least three reasons why it is very difficult to obtain con-
certed action to enforce the opinion of the ICJ. There are those who can
see small improvements that the government is making-the treatment of
the Indian and Chinese populations so important to other Commonwealth
countries, in the pass system, in the privileges for the Cape colored popu-
lation-to show that the situation is improving rather than worsening.' 9 In
September, 1971, a racially mixed trade delegation-the first in his-
tory-went forth from Durban. Barclay's Bank has dared to risk a black
teller serving white customers. The Junior Mayor of Johannesburg publicly
advocates dialogue with non-whites. Chinese are admitted to university
functions. 20 Small improvements, these, but they are cracks in the apar-
theid wall.
The second reason why no enforceable sanctions can or will be applied
under the Charter is that some of the large countries of the world find it
profitable to trade with South Africa; Britain has decided to sell weapons
to the Republic of South Africa in face of the U.N. Arms Embargo. France
16 Boston Globe, June 30, 197 1.
"7See U.N. Charter, Article 96 (l).
18Some doubt was expressed as to whether the General Assembly had the power to
terminate the mandate with South Africa's assent. See John F. Murphy, The Trend Towards
Anarchy In the U.N., 54 A.B.A.J., 267, 69 (March, 1968).
19 Kevin P. Phillips, Washington Post, January 30, 197 1.20Boston Globe, September 29, 197 1.
21 Boston Globe, June 16, 1971.
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is the largest supplier of arms to South Africa, and finds it profitable to stay
that way. The United States grants a bi-latteral quota worth nearly $5
million per year for African sugar exports.
Until recently the United States continued to support the price of South
African gold, an important prop to its economy. Throughout Africa, in-
cluding the white local pockets. United States investments totaled nearly
$2 billion, $700 million solely in South Africa, while 36 other countries
shared the balance of $ 1.3 billion. There has been a strenuous debate in the
United States as to whether its international corporations should continue
to invest their funds and maintain factories in South Africa in view of its
racial policy.
Dr. Alan Paton, the distinguished South African liberal author, pointed
out in an address at Harvard in June, 197 1, that when people of different
classes are being paid at different earning levels, they commence to under-
stand each other better, the closer their earnings converge. It was his view
that American business should continue to invest in South Africa in order
to give employment to those who would otherwise be without a means of
livelihood.
Another reason why there have been only token efforts to enforce the
sanctions against South Africa, is that the leaders of the newly emanci-
pated African nations are trying to engage in a dialogue with the white
leaders so that peaceful progress toward emancipation can be made. In the
Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, leaders of 14 African states made an honest
effort to engage South African white rulers in negotiations on emancipa-
tion. Prime Minister Johannes Vorster proposed to several African states
that they accept economic assistance from the Republic. The first crack in
African unity appeared when President Felix Houphouet- Biogny of the
Ivory Coast urged a positive response to Premier Voster's offer for dia-
logue.
Houphouet- Boigny is probably the most influential black moderate,
who feels that black leaders should take advantage of the open door. He
feels that if a dialogue develops between Black Africa and South Africa, it
would prevent a terrible bloodletting. In the meantime, apartheid would
atrophy. Furthermore, he has convinced nine countries to join him in
establishing bilateral approaches to Pretoria. They contain 23 million
people or 6 per cent of Africa's population. In opposition are 28 countries
with 69 million of the continent's population, as presumably are most of the
14 per cent of Africa's peoples who live in still colonized territories.
We have, in an all too hasty fashion, examined some of the argu-
ments-pro and con-for a strict policy by the West with regard to the
stewardship of South Africa and Rhodesia over their black inhabitants.
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The liberals cry out against the failure of the rich and powerful nations to
honor the U.N. Charter. C. L. Sulzburger, reporting in the New York
Times, has exposed apartheid as "absurd," "degrading," "immoral," "un-
just" and "unreal." Yet the House of Commons voted 353 to 244 for
sanctions which clearly shows that about 40 per cent of the British public
is opposed to sanctions against Rhodesia. Last year saw a record of
254,000 tourists visiting Salisbury.
The real question is: In a world full of tensions, frustrations and alarums,
with unbalanced and psychotic people in a position to initiate instant
Armageddon, can we afford another area where people's boiling point is
low, 22 and the danger of conflagration is very high. Here is how Myres S.
McDougal and W. Michael Reisman regard the problem in an essay en-
titled Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International
ConcernP3
... In the contemporary intensely inter-dependent world, peoples interact not
merely through the modalities of collaborative or combative operations but
also through shared subjectivities-not merely through the physical move-
ments of goods and services or exercises with armaments, but also through
communications in which they simply take each other into account .... Much
more important than the physical movements are the communications which
people make to each other. In the case of Rhodesia, the other peoples of
Africa have regarded themselves as affected by the authoritarian and racist
policies of the Rhodesian elites. ...
22The Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960, caused worldwide uproar when 69
Africans in a crowd of thousands protesting apartheid and racial segregation in South Africa
were shot to death by the police.
262 AM. J. INT'L LAW 1, 12.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
